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Abstract
Technological innovation and consequential
decentralisation are driving forces in the ongoing
evolution and increasing openness of digital
infrastructures and services. One of the most
discussed and allegedly disruptive innovations is the
distributed database technology referred to as
blockchain. Although it is still in its technological
infancy, experimental adoption and customization
seem to be in full progress in various potential fields
of application ranging from decentralized grids for
computation and storage to global financial services.
However, the technology and its path of development
still entail a lot of common unknowns for
practitioners and researchers alike. Especially
regarding the question how the technology could
amend or be incorporated into the existing landscape
of digital services, processes and infrastructures.
Hence, in this article we develop an ontology that (1)
clearly delineates common terminology, core
concepts and components, their relationships as well
as innovative features of blockchain technology. It
further (2) connects these insights with implications
for relevant types of digital market models. Our
framework is of high theoretical and practical value
as it provides researchers and practitioners a
common basis for communication and means for
guided analysis of blockchain applicability.

1. Introduction
Identification and valid analysis of blockchain
ecosystems and application scenarios impose a
prevailing issue for practitioners and researchers.
Despite many discussions, press releases and talks
about blockchain technology, few truly and fully
understand or can actually describe with certainty the
basic or innovative features introduced by blockchain
technology. This most likely also holds true for crossdisciplinary
researchers
from
non-technical
disciplines. Reasons might be the complex interplay
of blockchain components and resulting properties
that are hard to grasp in detail as well as the lack of a
solid common knowledge base, especially in
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information systems (IS). The most recent publicly
available blockchain instantiations, e.g. Ethereum,
comprise a decentralized peer-to-peer network, a
built-in public-key infrastructure, cryptographically
enabled data structures for storing transactions as
well as data attached to transactions and include a
Turing complete programming language based on a
replicated virtual machine. Each of these components
can be itself quite complex to understand, especially
for business, economic, social and political science
researchers and practitioners.
Additionally, blockchain systems introduce new
ways of decentralisation and delegation of services
into the hands of autonomous interacting pieces of
code, also referred to as smart contracts. These
autonomous and hence trust-free setups also attack
current
trust
establishing
institutions
and
intermediaries, such as banks or market place
operators. Incumbent role and business models in
digital ecosystems might no longer apply in the
context of blockchain systems. These circumstances
lead to confusion and uncertainty regarding actual
use cases and their technological and economical
validity.
It comes with no surprise that an established and
often cited phrase related to blockchain technology
states that "blockchain is an innovative technology in
search of use cases".
Nonetheless, potential use cases and their
implications are frequently discussed by a variety of
researchers,
practitioners
and
governmental
institutions alike. The current focus of the discussion
is primarily associated with financial market
infrastructure and related services, e.g. payments and
post-trading. The likely reason for this single focused
attention and media coverage is the allegedly
disruptive potential of the technology for the
financial sector. This storyline is currently rephrased
by nearly every major bank [36] or consulting
company [4] as well as central banks [17] and
financial market authorities [8]. Its potential impact is
often compared to the impact the internet had on
global interconnectedness in societal as well as
business environments.
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However, the how and why regarding these use
cases is often missing in the discussions or
descriptions which are often limited to an abstract
and opaque level.
From a practical perspective, the accelerating
process of decentralisation of services in areas like
retail payment services [5] and asset management can
hence be seen to be only a precursor of uprising
scenarios for services in supply chain management,
insurance, digital knowledge management, e-business
and e-commerce. These developments are further
pushed by societal trends towards a networked
society [10] and platform-mediated services. Clients
become increasingly connected as highly available,
reliable network infrastructure is common even for
retail customers. Thus, the need for intermediaries
providing solid and reliable service infrastructure
while leveraging economies of scale is diminishing
with an increasing global digitization and
interconnectedness.
These
environmental
developments
in
combination with digital innovation in form of
blockchain technology probably hold opportunities to
create and integrate new services and business
models into the existing digital economy. Digital
innovation life cycles can be described by four
phases as reviewed by [11]: discovery, development,
diffusion, impact. Discovery of blockchain
technology can be dated to 2015 when the majority of
financial institutions publicly announced interest into
the innovation. Given that there are almost daily
announcements in the news media of prototypes and
tests by companies from various industries, the
development phase is probably reached. According to
[11] the relevant managerial questions arising during
theses phases are "What constitutes the digital
innovation's core feature set?", "To what potential
organizational uses can it be put?", "What
complementary products and services are needed to
flesh out the 'whole product solution'?", "what other
elements (organizational, technological) comprise a
sound innovation system incorporating the digital
innovation?".
We summarise these relevant managerial
questions by formulating the following research
question: How can blockchain (eco)systems and
associated roles be described and analysed in the
context of digital economies?
Against the backdrop of the outlined situation, the
overall goal of this paper is twofold. First, by
providing a comprehensive conceptual framework we
aim to support practitioners to evaluate use cases,
new business models and roles in the existing,
evolving and emerging blockchain ecosystems.
Second, the framework provides cross-disciplinary

researchers and practitioners with a structured
knowledge base and a common vocabulary regarding
terms, concepts and their relationships as well as
roles that is in line with the blockchain development
community domain.
It provides an ubiquitous
language for blockchain system contexts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section two provides a brief overview of the
background of the technology and fundamental
definitions. This also entails a review of related
literature on blockchain technology in information
systems. In section three we explain our research
approach and methodology. Section four comprises
the development of the conceptual framework.
Section five contains a critical review of our results
before we conclude and provide an outlook for future
research in section six.

2. Background
2.2 Related Literature
The attention to blockchain technology as well as
Cryptocurrencies is still quite limited in the discipline
of information systems. This is astonishing as
practitioners, especially in the finance and insurance
sector are relentlessly working on the identification
of reasonable use cases and timely technological
validation in form of prototypes based on different
blockchain technologies [43].
Although the adoption has already begun, due to
the fact that almost all systems are open source,
adoption can be more complicated as only recently
emphasized by [12].
A common limitation of previous work on
blockchain technology is that it is either sticking to a
mono-disciplinary perspective, e.g. cryptographic
security [28], consensus algorithms [23], economics
[3], or focuses specific cryptocurrencies which are
only a single purpose instantiation of a blockchain
system [20].
The truly innovative character of the technology,
however, is its openness and technologically driven
capability to pervade multiple vertical layers of
digital ecosystem infrastructure. Pervasiveness can
span the backend database, the business logic, up to
the organisational layers due to smart contracts'
capabilities in form of autonomous rule and process
representation. However, it is quite difficult to
capture all these different and complex layers into a
single perspective. The design science approach of
[2] provides a first glimpse at the potential economic
implications of these systems.
Consequently, the focus of this study is to derive
a conceptual framework that unifies blockchain
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concepts and their relationships to digital market
models into a single framework. This way, it guides
researchers and practitioners in their analyses of
blockchain systems research and application. We
focus on the general purpose of information systems
research discipline by describing and analysing the
interdependencies between IT artifacts and their
interaction with socio-technical systems [18].
In the context of information systems literature,
we follow the call of [37] who request "(1) deeper
theoretical work on the notion of infrastructures, (2)
new theoretical lenses to understand the paradoxical
nature of change and control in digital infrastructures,
and (3) better understanding of the ways in which
infrastructural change shapes IT governance, IS
development, and promotes new effects across all
levels of analysis."

implications for the digital infrastructure and the
governance of blockchain systems as well as general
implications of pervasive decentralisation. Third, we
derive the impact on digital market models.

3. Research Design

4.2 Blockchain
Relationships

Theorizing in IS provides a variety of paths to be
followed as summarised by [13]. Descriptive
theories, i.e. theories that state "what is", are needed
when very little is known about the phenomenon in
question. Ontologies provide a framework for
structured knowledge representation [19, 16]. They
establish concepts and their relationships in a specific
knowledge domain to facilitate communication and
collaboration in the explicit context of that domain
[15]. Different variations of this type of theory are
classification schemata, conceptual frameworks and
taxonomies [13].
We rely on the description of basic components of
an ontology as declared by [39]. According to them
an ontology necessarily includes a vocabulary of
terms and specifications of their meaning, i.e.
definitions. We aim to construct a semi-formal
ontology as described by [39] which primarily
consists of textual descriptions. It provides the basis
to derive the influence of the blockchain induced
pervasive decentralisation on different levels of the
digital infrastructure as well as market models.
One example for this type of approach is the work
of [20]. They outline potential impacts of
cryptocurrencies on digital payment system platforms
and services. In contrast, however, our study explores
a broader, more general scope of digital market
models in the context of blockchain. Hence, we
achieve a higher generalisability of obtained results,
i.e. a more general applicability, as our framework is
not bound to a single service domain.
Our approach is divided into four consecutive
steps. First, we delineate the core concepts and
features of blockchain systems and split blockchain
systems into two logical layers. Second, we induct

4. Ontology Development
The subsequent analyses and ontology
development is primarily based on the most
comprehensive resource available for smart contract
systems, i.e. the documentation of the Ethereum
blockchain. We rely on the yellow paper [42] which
describes the technology in detail. For vocabulary
and concept naming we rely on the github
documentation
(https://github.com/ethereum/wiki)
and the Ethereum blog (https://blog.ethereum.org).
Concepts of the ontology are formatted italic.

System

Concepts

and

We start with the definitions of a common set of
blockchain components and relationships as a first
part of our blockchain ontology.
Basically, a blockchain is a distributed,
transactional database. Globally distributed nodes
are linked by a peer-to-peer (P2P) communication
network with its own layer of protocol messages for
node communication and peer discovery. Nodes
identify each other by their IP address and users
reference each other via their public key. The
corresponding private key of a user is used to
cryptographically sign messages and transactions
(Tx). Put differently, he authorises them by
cryptographically assuring that they represent his
intention.
A node is a physical/virtual machine that
communicates via TCP/IP and UDP with other
nodes. In contrast, a user is only represented by a
public key address and could theoretically login from
any other node. This is possible as each of the nodes
maintains a database of all historical, valid
transactions that have been sent between the nodes of
the network. Transactions are grouped into blocks.
Every block references the previous block of
transactions and hence a temporal ordering of
transactions is achieved. Order of transactions within
a block are determined by a randomly selected node
in line with the applied consensus algorithm. Light
client nodes are configured such that they only
collect the hashes of blocks of transactions to safe
disk space and make the services available on less
performant devices like smartphones.
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Every blockchain's core functionality is to provide
validated, immutable transactions, i.e. database
updates, that are consistent between a large number
of nodes in a global network. Blockchains use
complex data structures (e.g. merkle trees or patricia
merkle trees) to efficiently store all transactions in a
way that the current state of the system inherently
depends on all previous transactions. Thus, changes
(e.g. manipulations) to historical transactions in a
single node result in invalid states if one would
recalculate the current state from all historical
transactions. If a node then proposes its transactions
which are identified as invalid by other nodes, the
node proposing invalid transactions will be ignored
by the other nodes in the system as it is inconsistent
(i.e. it violates the protocol) with the other nodes. For
the sake of brevity, we refer to [28, 42, 27] for a more
detailed description of these data structures.
It is worth noting, that the meaning of the word
transaction can be ambiguous in the context of a
blockchain. On the one hand, a blockchain is a
database and in this traditional context it can simply
mean the update of data in the database. On the other
hand, a blockchain often facilitates the transfer of

tokens, where a transaction then refers to the transfer
of tokens from one user to another user. Tokens are
either inherent to the system or implemented in
higher layer scripting or programming languages.
Most implementations feature a built-in scripting
language which is able, in a very limited way, similar
to stored procedures in traditional databases, to
execute additional business logic triggered by a
transaction. More recent generations of the
technology, for example Ethereum and Hyperledger,
extend the basic idea of a scripting language by
integrating a fully fledged programming language
executed by an internal virtual machine. These
programming languages have also access to complex
data types and data structures and even small, locally
separated databases that can be used to store and
retrieve data. The code is deployed into the
blockchain database at every node and can be
triggered by certain transaction events. This enables
far more possibilities than transactions of tokens as
cryptocurrencies were intended to do.
These pieces of code are often referred to as
smart contracts. Although, the notion of a contract is
somewhat misleading. The origin of that notion dates

Figure 1. Blockchain System Concepts and Relaitionships
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back to the idea of code-based self-executing legal
contracts as described by [34]. However, for purposes
of consistency we keep the notion of smart contracts.
Smart contract execution can be compared to
atomic transactions, i.e., the transition from the
current database state to the next database state by
changing data. If one part of the code execution fails,
the whole transaction fails and the next state is not
reached. Execution time is limited in an economical
way, i.e. you have to pay for execution time. This
prevents nodes from executing one smart contract
infinitely. As the state transition, i.e., smart contract
code execution is performed on every node in the
network, infinite execution would put the whole
blockchain system to halt. One consequence is that
smart contracts cannot trigger themselves as this
would require that they are continuously executed.
There is no self-execution at a certain point in time or
environmental event without explicit external
intervention. This is a common misunderstanding of
how these systems operate.
Blockchain systems currently face some other
technical limitations: Capacity, latency and query
capabilities are quite limited in comparison to other
distributed database systems as described by [24].
However, these constraints are likely to be of
transient nature and further improvements and future
innovations are probably able to solve current
limitations. For the sake of brevity we leave technical
limitations aside during our analysis.
Figure 1 depicts the previous conceptual descriptions
to provide a comprehensive overview of generic
blockchain system components and relationships.
In the next two sections we review blockchain system
infrastructure, define concepts and relations and
derive implications for digital infrastructures. We
then discuss the implications for digital market
models.

4.2. Pervasive Decentralisation of Digital
Infrastructure
We start with further dividing blockchain systems

into two layers of code. The first layer is the so called
fabric layer, which is a common concept in the
global blockchain development community. The
fabric layer denotes the actual blockchain code base
that comprises the communication layer, the publickey infrastructure, the data structures to construct and
maintain the database as well as the execution
environment for smart contract languages. The
second layer comprises the application logic of
services implemented in form of smart contracts. We
refer to the second layer as application layer.
Services based on one or more smart contracts are
commonly called Decentralised Applications
(DApps). Figure 2 visualises the different layers.
A remarkable fact worth noting is, that the system
spans across multiple layers of traditional n-Tier
architectures. This is the reason for the technology's
pervasiveness and has far reaching implications as we
will discuss later.
The Fabric Layer. It is crucial to note, that there
is a strong centralisation of control of the fabric layer.
Whoever develops and maintains the fabric layer is in
ultimate control of the whole system's functioning.
Even if he cannot directly modify the state of the
system as represented by the blockchain database.
If the fabric layer is developed by a single company
and the code base is not open source, the whole
system will always be in the hand of this company. If
it is kept open source, the organization of developers
and maintenance of the code is more complex. We
refer to [6, 14, 25, 22] for background on open source
communities. This is also something that needs to be
considered in the context of software system adoption
by corporations as is emphasized by [26].
The fabric layer fulfills basic services. Databases
usually come with an integrated module to manage
different types of users that can have different levels
of permissions. For example, a user might only be
able to read certain subsets of the database and is not
allowed to send any transactions, i.e., changes to the
data. A super user, however, usually has the full set
of rights or can grant them. Blockchain systems, so
far, make no differentiation between users and user
management modules only provide rudimentary
functionality like account creation and basic
password management.
This also implies that every user has full
transparency regarding the transactions and deployed
smart contract code of other blockchain system users.
In a setup, however, where only a set of
permissioned users can see and validate transactions
and blocks, privacy is no longer an issue if
permissioned parties would see the content in a
traditional setup as well. This permissioned
blockchain system or private blockchain is in stark

Figure 2. Layers of Blockchain Systems
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contrast to the idea of public blockchains like Bitcoin
or Ethereum. However, for testing purposes and
business setups it is the primary choice.
Hybrid systems are currently discussed as well,
however, at the time of writing there is no public
hybrid system live and running. Ripple could be
considered a hybrid system, although it does not
maintain a blockchain of transactions in the fashion
we described. From an economic perspective, a
private permissioned system merely resembles an
intra- or inter-group technology upgrade. If there is
no trust issue among nodes with respect to validity of
database updates the only reason to opt for a
blockchain is its immutable log of historical
transactions for audibility purposes.
In an economic context, a hybrid system enables a
restricted set of users to access the services. Hence a
hybrid blockchain can be considered a club good.
Users are excludable from the system but the
admitted users have no further restrictions with
respect to usage of the systems services.
A public blockchain, on the contrary, resembles a
public good. That is, users are non-excludable from
its services and there is no rivalry among users. If
there is rivalry for some reason, it could be
considered a common good. If public blockchains
enable basic services like car or citizenship registry,
the government would be responsible for provision
and maintenance of fabric layer. Provision of public
goods is a complex undertaking [40] people building
the system might get no rewards besides the system
itself and others may use it for free without
contributing. It can be incentivised by so called
dominant assurance contracts as proposed by [35].
The literature regarding the economics of goods is
actually quite vast. We refer to [21] for an overview.
Besides, a completely open setup, where any user can
join if he can install the fabric layer software,
introduces potential issues regarding regulations of
service provision. For example, in the case of a
payment service, anti money-laundering and know
your customer processes are required by regulation
and hinder adoption, especially in the financial sector
[8, 9].
The Application Layer. So far we discussed the
levels of decentralisation of the fabric layer which is
comprising the blockchain system itself. We will now
discuss the implications of decentralisation of the
application layer in more detail.
The blockchain itself is developed by a group of
architects and developers and hence is always under
control of these development teams.
On the contrary, the code of the application layer
can be written and bound to the system by any
participant. The code itself is then under control of

the participant who deployed the piece of code. It
follows, that the control at the application layer is
distributed among the participants who deployed the
code.
Once the system is running, open to the public
and users start deploying their own code onto the
blockchain system, the developers of the fabric layer
are no longer in control of what is actually happening
on top of the system, i.e. within the application layer.
Consequently, the control of the application layer
is pushed into the hands of a decentralised user space
and its control is equally decentralised. The code of
smart contracts, can be built in such a way, that the
control is entirely left over to the piece of code
deployed. If a transaction contains such smart
contract code, a new participant (address) is
registered in the system. The new participant is the
smart contract and has its own address in form of a
public address. If there is no access control
mechanism implemented by the participant who
deployed the smart contract, the code becomes
autonomous. This leads to a setup where only the
piece of code itself 'determines' what happens when it
is triggered, based on the programmed rules it
contains. Hence, participants can hand over decision
making to an autonomously deciding piece of
software that is accessible for other participants of
the system.
The resulting decentralisation of control in
combination with the immutable representation of
transfer of possession or, more generally, speaking
the transition of system states, leads to the common
notion of 'trustless systems'. These can be build on
the application layer.
An immediate consequence is that business logic
based on smart contracts can use the blockchain
system with all its features in an autonomous way.
Put differently, smart contracts can represent the
business logic, e.g. market mechanisms or decision
making and in addition communicate with each other,
i.e., call or trigger each other. They can hence create
a web of tiny services that enable the creation and
autonomous activity of very complex systems.
However, recall that the activity must always be
triggered by an external impulse. A smart contract
could, for example, realise a service that maintains a
small database accessible only by this contract. It
could evaluate data attached to a transaction and
trigger further transactions to other users or smart
contracts. Hence, smart contracts could implement
autonomous market mechanisms or complex microservice interactions which, in total, realise more
sophisticated service logic like an autonomous
portfolio management service. In summary,
autonomous service provision in combination with
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The other case would be that frequent interaction
with external services is needed in order to bind any
value to the system. In that case, the decentralisation
of control ends at the boundaries to other systems and
the full potential of autonomous smart contracts can
no longer be leveraged. The binding interoperation
then introduces trust into the external institution and
the interface(s) the system needs to be bound to. For
example, if we build a payment system and there is
no way to purchase goods or services with the
internal token, then we need an exchange to transfer
the token into a valuable currency. We then have a
trusted interface to the issuer of the outside currency
to be valuable and stable in value.
Furthermore, the actual types of services, and the
market mechanisms (provided on the application
layer) by which these services are priced determine
the relevant roles in such an ecosystem. The major
difference to current digital market models is,
however,
the
possible
decentralisation
of
intermediaries by autonomous DApps. Hence,
fundamental question becomes whether the
traditional roles of digital market models can be
delegated to an autonomous piece of code. For an
overview of roles and market models in the context
of digital platforms we refer to [38] and will discuss
the implications in the next section.
Previous
considerations
also
introduce
collaboration on different levels, either in form of
standardization of smart contract interfaces or the
standardization of complete services and process
interoperability. For incumbent digital services and
standardization we refer to [30]. However, the design
of digital services itself can be quite sophisticated
Table 1. Applicability Analysis Framework

Fabric
Layer

Layer

Dimension

Considerations

Governance
Type





Ecosystem
Closedness





Club Good
Common Good
Public Good

Self-Contained
Trusted Interfaces
Community
Currency
 Debt/Equity
Value Linking
Issuance
 Commercial Bank
 Central Bank
 Multi-sided
Market Type
 Collaborative
 P2P
and several dimensions have to be taken into account
according to the findings of [41].
Application Layer

trustless setups of smart contracts could replace trust
intermediaries.
It is worth noting here, that any information that
is not generated by a transaction has to be introduced
as data attached to a transaction. This also holds for
time events. Put differently, any activity in the
system needs to be triggered by a node controlled
from outside of the network (which of course can be
another software system). This is a functional
limitation to be kept in mind.
The basic set of blockchain functionalities enables
users to transact whatever is represented by the builtin tokens of the blockchain system. However, tokens
can also be represented by a smart contract as a
mapping of user addresses to an account balance
stored in the smart contract. That is, when the smart
contract transfers any amount of the token to a
another it does so by setting an entry into its local
database which represents the amount and the user
address. Note that this is equivalent to what a bank
does if it credits a certain amount of a currency to a
customer's account. Consequently, these tokens could
also be maintained autonomously by the smart
contract.
However, merely the technical creation of the
token does not attach any value to it. The platform
openness of public blockchains influences this
dimension of value representation in blockchain
based ecosystems as we discuss next. If an
ecosystem, comprised of the services interacting on
the application layer, is self-sufficient in an
economical sense of value transaction, it can be
considered self-contained or closed. That is, if
services in the system only rely upon other services
or information generated within the system. We
provide an example for such a system setup in the
context of the internet of things. Assume that spare
parts which are delivered by autonomous drones can
be paid with the electricity produced by the spare part
purchaser's energy plants. These services could
interact without exchanging with other ecosystems as
they are directly offsetting each other. If this is the
case, value, or valuable services are created within
the system and can also be redeemed or spent within
the system. Such a closedness of the ecosystem
implies that there is no need to bind to external
systems in order to exchange information or tokens
of any value. Users and services can rely on
internally issued tokens in order to interoperate, i.e.
use the token as a medium for exchange. An extreme
scenario would be that a whole economy is
represented on a blockchain system. for example, the
ecosystem of an online multiplayer game. It follows
that the higher the closedness of the ecosystem, the
more suitable is a blockchain infrastructure.
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These considerations further lead to the known
critical mass dilemma in a multi-sided market [32] if
the adoption by either service providers or customers
is low. Both, customers as well as services providers
are needed simultaneously in order to achieve a
critical mass and subsequently a high level of
closedness of the system.
The discussion so far is also tightly related to the
real-world problem of how currency actually
becomes valuable. This problem is usually solved by
trust in a system of central banks as well as
commercial banks. However, other ideas have been
around for several decades, e.g. free banking systems
where the same currency varies in value dependent
on the bank that issued the note or coin [33]. Another
possibility is a community currency which resembles
to the setup of a closed ecosystem.
The traditional ways of binding an ecosystem to
valuable tokens, i.e., database entries are commercial
bank money and central bank money issuance. A
fundamental game changer for a blockchain system
emerges if a bank directly provides value backing of
blockchain issued tokens, e.g. by issuing commercial
bank money on the blockchain. The closedness of the
system becomes irrelevant, as one can use the
commercial money token as medium to the outside
world. It does not make any difference if the token is
the inherent token of the respective blockchain
system or a token that is issued by a smart contract
controlled by the bank. This setup would practically
solve the problem of ecosystem or value binding with
traditional means. However, the needed trust in
institutions is, then again, necessary at the trusted
interfaces.
Another possibility of ecosystem value linking
would be a central bank backing of one or more
tokens of the system. This would leverage the
position of a central bank, which is coupled directly
to the economy of one or more nations. Although this
would facilitate the diffusion and ease of use of
blockchain systems, it would, once again, introduce
the hierarchies and links to institutional trust of the
current financial system. The question boils down to
whether a single central governmental authority or
multiple private institutions are the preferable option
if community currency or ecosystem closedness are
not applicable. Actual discussions by central banks
regarding digital currency issuance became public
only recently [7, 31].

4.4. Implications for Digital Platforms and
Market Models
Blockchain technology is by design a multi user
system. It is designed for continuous, non-centrally

governed interaction among (large) heterogeneous
groups of participants. Furthermore, it supports the
independent development and deployment of
autonomous, collaborative and highly interoperable
services by every user of the system. Against the
backdrop
of
these
core
capabilities
we
consequentially narrow our perspective on digital
market models to those likely to provide valid use
cases for blockchains. A market model should rely
upon these kinds of participant groups and also
interaction among them. We have identified three
types of market models that match these criteria,
namely multi-sided, collaborative and P2P markets
[1].
Multi-sided markets are characterised by the
interaction of multiple parties with different interests
in a single market mechanism [29]. Usually,
intermediaries provide services of information or
product brokerage in the role of platform providers.
Examples are credit cards and stock exchanges. The
role of intermediaries is at stake in blokchain based
ecosystems. They are subject to decentralisation by
autonomous DApps if the service is of transactional
character and of low complexity.
Collaborative markets are equally characterised
by multiple parties interacting on platforms which
provide basic means of exchange for information or
goods. Examples are open source software or open
knowledge (e.g. wikipedia) platforms. As these types
of platforms or markets are already open and often
closed ecosystems they provide suitable candidates to
profit from blockchain infrastructure. As payments
for contributions are an issue that could be solved by
blockchain infrastructure.
P2P markets are natural candidates to profit from
blockchain infrastructure due to their high ecosystem
closedness. Blockchain systems could provide the
infrastructure to decentralise intermediary services
and means of trustless payments in comparison to
current systems. Examples are Foodsharing,
Couchsurfing, P2P-Lending and Filesharing.
The last artifact of our ontology is table 1 and
summarises the four dimensions that should be
covered during a blockchain applicability analysis. It
can be applied by reproducing our considerations in
the last two sections in an explicit business domain.

5. Discussion
Our framework development has shown that there are
two imminent implications from an economic
perspective. First, the platform providers underlying
all market models could be replaced by decentralised
blockchain systems. Especially if their services are
neither highly complex nor computational intensive.
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For example crowdfunding, or crowdinvesting
platform providers in collaborative markets and
platform providers in multi-sided markets, e.g. Uber
or AirBnb.
Second, trusted third-party service providers
replacement in multi-sided markets might be limited
fit due to the governance centralisation of the fabric
layer. Additional conditions must be considered to
make it an attractive alternative to a central thirdparty. The economic incentives of the fabric layer
governance party must be in line with the application
layer party. This relationship should also be rather
stable over time in order to ensure long term support
for the ecosystem. This argumentation is not limited
to any market model. Decentralisation and hence
trust decentralisation is only as good as the most
basic layer - the fabric layer.
With our ontology we contribute to theory in
general by introducing an ontology for the domain of
blockchain systems. The framework and its
development process provide in-depth knowledge on
blockchain systems in general and their influence on
the digital ecosystems in particular. We further
contribute to the literature on strategic frameworks
that identify new sources of value creation in form of
digital product platforms [44]. The framework is also
of high practical relevance due to its guiding
capabilities for the analysis of blockchain use cases.

6. Conclusion and Outlook
The initially stated goal of this work is to derive a
framework that (1) provides a common basis of
concepts for the domain of blockchain systems and
(2) can be applied by researchers and practitioners to
assess the implications of Blockchain technology in
various economic and academic contexts. In this
work we develop an ontology that describes common
components of blockchain systems and proposes a
common vocabulary for communication. We further
introduce
the
perspective
of
pervasive
decentralisation of multiple layers of digital
infrastructure by blockchain technology. Finally, we
outline implications for market models in the digital
economy, that are likely to be affected by blockchain
systems.
Interoperability is key in any e-Business
environment. Blockchain infrastructure has the
potential to contribute due to its pervasive,
decentralised and open design. Future research could
hence focus on how blockchain systems can be
leveraged for better interoperability in electronic
markets.
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